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IN THE SOPREME COORT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
politic and corporate,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- vs MURRAY CITY REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY and MURRAY CITY, a
municipal corporation,
VAUGHN SOFFE, JACK DEMANN
and JACK FITTS,

Case No. 15755

Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an.action contesting the validity of the
adoption of a plan for redevelopment by the defendantsrespondents pursuant to the Utah Neighborhood Development Act
and challenges the validity of the Murray City Ordinance enacted to implement said Utah Neighborhood Development Act on
procedural and constitutional grounds, and alternatively requiring that the defendants-respondents redraw their project
area to conform with the requirements of the Utah NeighborhoodDevelopment Act.
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DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
The initial complaint in this matter pleaJed five
causes of Action which may be summarized as follows:
1.

The First Cause of Action, in twenty-two para-

graphs, asserts that the Murray City Redevelopment Plan and the
Ordinance by which that Plan was adopted are not in conformity
with the letter or the intent of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act under which they were promulgated.
2.

The Second Cause of Action challenges the consti-

tutionality of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act as being, in
violation of Utah Constitution, Article VI, §28 which prohibits the
Legislature from delegating to any special commission any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property or effects, to levy taxes or to perform any
municipal functions.
3.

The Third Cause of Action challenges the consti-

tutionality of section 11-19-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
beinq in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article VI, §29 which
I

prohibits the Legislature from authorizing the state, county, city,
town, township, district or other political subdivision of the
State to lend its credit in aid of any private enterprise.
5.

The Fourth Cause of Action challenges the consti-

tutionality of section 11-19-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as bein1
in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, §5, which
prohibits the Legislature from imposing taxes for any local sub-

- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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division but may vest such powers to a&sess and collect taxes in
such subdivision.

The complaint alleged that Section 11-19-29

will force Salt Lake County to increase its mill levy or other
taxes by depriving the county of its incremental ad valorm tax,
thus imposing a tax on the county for the benefit of the redevelopmen£ area in violation.of the constitutional provision.
5.

The Fifth Cause of Action challenges the consti-

tutionality of section 11-19-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
being in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, §10,
which provides that the full value of each tax resource shall be
available to each governmental subdivision entitled thereto.
Upon motion by the defendants-respondents for Summary
Judgment, the trial court, on September 1, 1977 granted defendantsrespondents a partial summary judgment as to tha Second, Third,
Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action (i.e., the constitutional
challenges) and also as to all issues raised in the First Cause
of Action except for two issues, to wit:
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence of
"blight" upon which the Murray Redevelopment Agency could base its determination
that blight existed in the project area, and

2.

Whether the boundary areas of the project
area comport with the description given in
the plan and the public notice;

which issues were reserved for trial.
-

3 -
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"Murray City Ordinance 564 purporting to
establish two project areas fails wholly
and completely to provide findings and
determinations based upon fact that the
project areas are bli~hted areas. The
determinations found in the plan are entirely conclusionary. There is no actual
adequate factual basis for finding of blight
by the City Commission."
(page 7, PlaintiffAppellant' s brief)
_Further, the statute cited at that same page is quote:
with emphasis added.

Such editorializing is inappropriate in wha:

purports to be a "statement of facts" and Defendants-Respondents
controvert such statements and assert that the entire record show:
that the findings and determinations of the Murray Redevelopment
Agency and the Murray City Commission were based upon fact.

Like·

wise, the balance of the "Facts" asserts as facts the items that
are the subject of plaintiff's argument and each of which is cont
verted by defendant.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has now raised on appeal
that were not raised in the pleadings.

(i.e. notice of

issu~

publicat~

Point I)
Prior to the filing of the" Complaint by Plaintiff, th:
following action had taken place in relation to the adoption of t
Redevelopment Plan, which is subject of this suit:
1. - On March 13, 1975 Murray City adopted its general

conununity plan, in which is designated the various planning and
zoning areas as well as the standards of population density desiro
for an orderly future development.
2.

(Ord. No. 368 Exhibit A)

The open space element -to the plan can be found- 6 -
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under heading "Specific Design Objectives and Controls" - adopted
with plan.

(p. 8 of Plan)
3.

June 1, 1976.
4.

The preliminary plan and boundaries were adopted
(Exhibit B)
Transmittal to the county Tax Assessor of the

boundaries of the preliminary plan and request for tax information
July 1, 1976.
5.

(Exhibit C)
There were no amendments to preliminary plan as

adopted on June 1, 1976.
6.

Approval of the general plan by the Agency was

given on July 1, 1976.
7.

The Redevelopment Commission adopted the general

plan and goals for development on July 1, 1976.
8.

The first hearing on final plan was held on

September 6, 1976.
9.

(Minutes, Exhibit D)

The City Commission directed that notice be given o

the joint public hearings on July ,12, 1976.
10.

(Minutes Exhipit E)

The first reading of proposed order by City

Commission on July 12, 1976.
11.

July 20, 1976, date of first publication of Hearing

'
.
Fl 2 )
(Proof of Publication
Ex h'b't
1 1
12.

A letter from Chairman of the Planning and Zoning

was received endorsing the plan to the City Commission on August 23
1976.

(Exhibit G)
13.

Notice was sent to property owners in the area on
-

7 -
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September 1, 1976.
14.

The public hearings were held on September 6 a~

September 8, 1976.
15.

1 2
(minutes, Exhibit H
>

Ordinance #453 read and adopted by City Commis'

on September 8, 1976.
16.

(Motion Exhibit I and J}

Letters were mailed to various taxing agencies

affected by plan on September 12, 1976.

Included with the 1ett

was:
1.
2.
3.

Copy of the Ordinance
The legal description of areas
A map of project areas
(Exhibit K)

The purposes and function of redevelopment are the
heart of this action and are set forth in the Utah Neighborhood
Development Act.

By this action plaintiff in effect is challen:

the public policy, the process, and the power and obligationso:
defendants Agency and City to perform their public functions an
duties as mandated by the Legislature in that law.

The Agencyi

City have discretionary powers and authority under the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act in im~lementing and effectuating t
public purposes declared therein.
In light of the settled law and long-standing redevelopment statutes, in other states,

(especially California a

Utah's Act is a copy of that state's law) it is clear that
defendants, Agency and City, at all times herein were acting with
the scope of the power and authority designated in the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act in their quest to eliminate blight
- 8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the project area pursuant to the standards imposed by declared
legislative policy.
In addition, plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, by its failure to make an official objection to
the Redevelopment Agency, the City or the Staffs of either body.
As shown, supra, the Utah Neighborhood Development Act
contains a complete administrative procedure for the adoption of
redevelopment plans which fulfills the requirements of due
process of law.

It is well established that where such procedure

is provided, objecting parties must avail themselves of the remedies therein before seeking the aid of the courts.
The law requires, and the defendants held, a duly
noticed hearing specifically for the purpose of hearing "any and
all persons having any objections to the proposed redevelopment
plan."

In addition any person objecting to the proposed plan

was invited to file a written statement of such objections prior
to the hearing.

Plaintiff has failed to comply with these

procedures.
While plaintiff's failure to pursue the administrative
remedies provided may not be a complete bar to this action, it is
certainly indicative of the sincerity in which plaintiff's charges
are made.

It clearly shows that plaintiff does not now desire,

nor has ever desired, to seek any solution to the ills it claims
infect the Project.

Its only concern is to stop the Project·

at any cost.

- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The pleadings

declarations and the public record Wit

respect to the preparation, adoption and contents of the Redevelopment Plan, the preparation, contents and recommendations
the MARC '76 Study, and the contents of the Plan in this actior
challenging the validity of the Redevelopment Plan clearly shoi
- that there·· i·s· no triable issue of any material fact, only legal
issues are presented in this action, and the trial court ruled
correctly.
The Redevelopment Plan for the downtown Murray City
Redevelopment Project as finally adopted was the culmination al
extensive and meaningful public and private effort, and is leg1
- and valid in all respects as herein shown .•

- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S PUBLICATION OF NOTICE
WAS IN SUBSTANTIAL ~OMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT.
Affidavits of publication show that defendantsrespondents gave notice to the public of the hearing to be
held in September, 1976 concerning the redevelopment plan,
by publication on five different dates, to-wit:

on July 20,

1976 in the Murray Eagle and on August 27, 1976, August 31,
1976, September 2, 1976 and on September 6, 1976 in the Salt
Lake Tribune.

Notice, therefore, appeared on five days, over

a period of seven weeks.

Defendants-respondents respectfully

submit that the notice thereby made was in substantial
compliance with the notice

requireme~ts

of section 11-19-16.

In Hopper v. Board of County Commissioners, 506 P.
2d 348 (1973), a case on which plaintiff-appellant relies,
the New Mexico court says: " . . . failure to publish substantially in the manner prescribed has the result that the
ordinance was never validly adopted."
added).

(at page 351)

(emphasis

In that case, where the statute required the

publication of the full text of the zoning ordinance, the
court found that publication of only two of the text's
twenty-two sections was not a substantial compliance with
the statutory requirements and therefore the ordinance had
- 11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not been validly adopted.
However, it has been held that what constitutes
"substantial compliance" is properly for the trial court to
determine.
1945).

Gustine City v. Silveira, 154 P.2d 474,

(Calif.

In Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co., 42 Cal App. 674,184

P.431 (Calif. 1919), the California court states:
"If, either in the summons or in the
resolution, there is not an entire ormnission of a statutory requirement, but merely
a defect, a court may properly determine
there has or has not been a substantial
compliance with the statute dependent
upon the facts of the particular case.
This judgment of what is a substantial
compliance with the statute is to be exercised in the first instance by the trial
court.
If the case is one where a requirement of the statute has not been
entirely disregarded, its [the trial
court's] determination of the question of
substantial compliance ought to be controlling in the absence of an abuse of
discretion".
(at page 434)
In the case sub judice, while the issue of notice
was never properly before the court (since i t did not appear
in the initial complaint and that complaint was never amended
to include that issue) to the ext~t that the trial court
may have considered the issue as it was raised by plaintiffappellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, it must be inferred
from the denial of plaintiff-appellant's motion that the trial
court had determined that the notice given by defendantsrespondents on five occasions prior to the hearing constituted
compliance with the notice requirements of section 11-19-16
- 12 -
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of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act.
It should be noted that in Hart et al. v. Bayless
Investment and Trading Co., 346 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1959),
a case also relied upon by plaintiff-appellant, the facts in
that case are in striking contrast to the facts in this case.
In Hart, the failure to comply with the notice and hearing
provisions of the Arizona Zoning Act was of such an extensive
nature as to constitute a gross violation of the statutory
mandate.

In that case, the adoption of a zoning ordinance

required two prior hearings, one before the Zoning Commission

to be followed, along with the Zoning Commission's recommendations,
be a second hearing before the Board of Supervisors.
hearing

Each

was required to be preceded by "at least 15 days

notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county seat".

Among a number of other

defects charged, the most outstanding is described by the
court:
"We can find no record or any formal
notice of hearing given, or that a
public hearing was actually held, or that
a recommended ordinance was referred to
the Board". (at page 1106).
Plainly, the facts of Hart indicate a gross failure
of complicance with the statutory notice requirement and
therefore Hart is readily distinguishable from our case.
Also, see:

- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Feldhake v. City of Sante Fe,
Dewitz v. Joyce-Pruitt Co.,

300P.2d 934;

20 N.M.

DeGraftenreid v. Casaus, 26 N.M.

572, 151 P,;

216, 190 P.728

city of Alamogordo v. McGee, 64 N.M.
321 (1958);

253, 327 p

Hughes v. City of Carlsbad, 53 N.M. 150, 203 P"
995 (1949).
The final statement on this point is that it was no·
and has not been properly raised in the plaintiff's complaint
has not been made an issue in this suit by amendment.

Thereh

not been even an attempt to amend and include this issue as pa
of the suit and the court is now powerless to review the' same
under the provisions of section 11-19-20, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 (as amended).

There has been no showing that plaintiff

w

without sufficient information relating to publication of noti
at the time the action was commenced, to enable it to have
included that issue initially.

Indeed, the very nature of the

issue would have required attention at that time.
The scope of review by the trial court was limited
the "substantial evidence" test.

...

Defendant's first memorandUl

Point B, discusses this issue in greater detail.

There has

been no showing that the trial court missapplied this rule anc
in fact, the courts decision is in keeping iwth the line of
cases on this point as it relates to the redevelopment proces!
See:

Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. APP·
777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954); In RedevelopmentJ!
for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d, 21, 289 P. 2d SJI
McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, Volume 2,
Section 10.36
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POINT

II

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF BLIGHT
WAS PROPERLY MADE BY THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY AND BY THE
MURRAY CITY COMMISSION AND WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT.
In its entirety, the definition of ."blighted
area" is stated in section 11-19-2(10) as follows:
"The words 'blighted area' are characterized
by the existence of buildings and structures,
used or intended to be used for residential,
commercial, industrial, or other purposes,
or any combination of such uses, which are
unfit or unsafe to occupy for such purposes or are conducive to ill health,
transmission of disease, infant mortality,
juvenile delinquency, and crime because of
any one or a combination of the following
factors:
(a)
Defective design and character of
physical construction,
(b)
Faulty interior arrangement and
exterior spacing,
(c)
High density of population and overcrowding,
(d)
Inadequate provision for ventilation,
light, sanitation, open spaces, and recreation
facilities,
(e) Age, obsolescence, deterioration,
dilapidation, mixed character, or shifting
of uses,
(f) Economic dislocation, deterioration, or
disuse, resulting from faulty planning,
(g)
Subdividing and sale of lots of irregular
form and shape and inadequate size for proper
usefulness and development,
(h)
Laying out of lots in disregard of
the contours and other physical characteristics
of the ground and surrounding conditions,
(i)
Existence of inadequate streets, open
spaces, and utilities, and
(j)
Existence of lots or other areas which
are subject to being submerged-by .water- -- (emphasis added)
- 15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Attenti6n

has been drawn to the word "characteritt

in order to emphasize that the concept of "blight" is not
given a rigid definition.

The statutory language of

section 11-19-2(10) appears to offer guidelines for legislath
bodies and agencies in determining whether or not an area is
"blighted" and a suitable subject for redevelopment efforts.
In addition to such guidelines, further assistance.
offered to such bodies by the language of section 11-19-2 (11):
"The words "project area mean an area
of a conununity which is a blighted area
within a designated redevelopment survey
area, the redevelopment of which is
necessary to effectuate the public purposes declared in this act ... " (emphasis
added)
The language of such purpose may be found in
section 11-19-2(9):
"The word "redevelopment" means the
planning, development, replanning, redesign, clearance, reconstruction, or rehabilitation, or any combination of these,
of all or part of a project area, and the
provisions of such residential, commercial, industrial, public, or other
structures or spaces as may be appropriate or necessary in the interest of
the general welfare."
(emphasis added)
Likewise, section ll-i9-21 concerning the ordinan~
by which the redevelopment plan is to be adopted states that
such ordinance will include a finding that:
"(a) The project area is a blighted
area, the redevelopment of which is
necessary to effectuate the public pur~·
poses declared in this act.
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(bl
The redeve+opment plan would redevelop the area in conformity with this
act and in the interests of the public
peace, health, safety and welfare, ...
(e)
The carrying out of the redevelopment plan would promote the public
peace, health, safety, and welfare of the
conununity and would effectuate the purposes
and policy of this act.
Where the statutory language does not more
specifically limit or restrict the legislative body or
the redevelopment agency in their determinations of what
constitutes blight and what is in the interest of the general
welfare, those bodies appropriately make such a determination
upon a reasonable "basis in fact", and, barring legislative and
agency determinations that are capricious, arbitrary and
irrational, the scope of judicial review is, in such matters,
greatly limited.

Nevertheless, plaintiff-appellant argues

that the blight which the redevelopment agency determined
existed in the project area was not "sufficient" to justify
a redevelopment plan for Murray City.
The statute is,silent as to what constitutes a
sufficient amount of blight, leaving it to the redevelopment agency and the legislative body to determine what is
in the interest and general welfare of the conununity.
In making their determinations, the redevelopment
agency and the Murray City Conunission had the following
information which was a~part of the record-~befo:r:e them:
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1.

The MARC '76 study (Exhibit "M"), the details

of which have already been extensively covered in defendants'
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
swronary Judgment, pages 18, 19 and 20.

This study, made by the

community Development Staff in 1976 showed 40. 44% of commercial
building in the survey area requiring either substantial struct
repair or total repalcement, and 59.37% of the residential
buildings needing such repair or replacement.
2.

Letter of August 6, 1976 from Jim Watts, the

Executive Director of the redevelopment agency, calling the
agency's attention to a series of court hearings involving
the Rifle Street Trailer Court which was closed down because
of improper electrical wiring and numerous health and sanitary
violations.
Gasliqht

This same letter also cited a condemnation of the

Building for similar violations.
3.

Letter of August 10, 1976 from Jim Watts,

reviewing for the redevelopment agency the crime statistics
for the area.

The letter states:
"Within the two areas there is a substantial amount of criminal offenses and a
check of the running log from January 1,
1976 until the present indicates that
the areas comprise about one-eighth of the
city's area and yet it accounts for over
one-third of the major crimes committed
in the city."

This letter gives the following break-down of
crime statistics for the two areas which, -as the letter states/
represents only one-eighth of the city's geographical area:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Assault and battery
Burglary
Forgery
Robbery
Sex offenses
Auto theft
Vandalism
Prowls
Average

31%
32%
26%
52%
41%
28%
35%
38%
35%

The letter further states:
"The reasons for this-high crime situation
within the project areas is due, in my
estimation, to the following reasons:
(1) The area is old and the age-of
the structures becomes a desirable
target for crimes against property.
(2)
The area is experiencing a shift
in uses, causing a mixed character
to exist in the areas designated for
redevelopment.
(3)
Since the area is shifting in use
and the buildings are quite old we
find that it is hard to keep the
buildings occupied. The vacant buildings created by this are also appealing
to such crimes as vandalism.
4.

Letter dated August 7, 1976, from

c.

G. Gillen,

the Murray City Chief of Police, indicating that the project
area is a high crime area and that th_e_ cause is the changing
use and character of the buildings.
"Many of the crimes that are committed
in the area happen because of the vacant
buildings, and overall deterioration.
We will be unable to change this trend
unless we can revitalize the area and make
it a viable location, which the proposal
would do."
5.

Minutes of the Murray City Commission of May 5,

1976 indicating a presentation by Ken Millard, the Planning
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consultant who worked with the MARC '76 members in their
study of community .conditions and needs, which presentation
included maps and models prepared for that study.
stated that:

It was

"This presentation would hopefully enable

the Planning and Zoning Commission to correlate their thinking
with what can be done."

The deposition of Mayor Soffe

illustrates the extent to which Murray City went to
evaluate the survey area, hold open citizen meetings, and
review recommendations from both lay citizen groups and
experts.
It is clear from the above, then, that while
plaintiff-appellant would prefer to find the above evidence
insufficient, the record nevertheless shows that the redevelop·
ment agency had before it ample indications of increasing
blight in the Murray community.
Plaintiff-appellant apparently does not recognize
that blight is not only a condition, but is also a process.
In its incipient stages, the process of blight may be first
seen as little more than peeling paint., faulty plumbing and wir
or broken windows, all commonly associated with economic
deterioration, both as its cause and as its effect.

In its

•r

stages, blight may take the form of widespread disease and
infant mortality, infestations of vermin, extensive criminal
activity or total economic collapse.

A blighted area may

exhibit one of these symptoms or several, or others not cited.
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One would expect the economic factors always to be present.
It would be a short-sighted community indeed which, aware
that such

a process has begun, chooses to wait until its

death rate or its crime rate reach the maximum possible
leveLbefore taking appropriate action.
Yet plaintiff-appellant would have this court
believe that the legisl?J.ture insists that the community
may not act until is a victim of a whole catalogue of plaques.
Plaintiff-appellant's reading of secti0n 11-19-2(10)

*

is not

sensible, for it would require us to understand that if, for
example, conditions of blight in a cormnunity result in an
unsanitary water supply.. causing (cholera? typhus?), the community
may not move against such conditions unless it can also show
an increase in juvenil_e delinquency.

Such a binding of a

community's powers would be ridiculous and the language of
11-19-2(10) cannot be so read.

A careful and sensible

reading of the statute indicates that the legislature provided
for a community to deal with the kind- of physical deterioration,
of whatever causes, which result in unfit, unsafe, unsanitary,or criminal conditions.
Although there are not Utah cases in point we
can find assistance from the California decisions, as Utah's

*

Plaintiff-appellant's brief cites 11-19-2(11) - apparently
a typographical error.
- 21 -
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Act is almost an exact duplication of the one found in that
State.

The following cases dealt with the issues of the

determination of blight and are discussed in more detail in
our memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment
contained in the file:
Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d
777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954)
Redevelopment Agency v. Modell, 177 Cal. App. 2i
321, 2 Cal. Reptr. 245 (1960)
Levin v. Township of Bridgewater,
5 7 N. J. 506,
274 A.2d, 45 A.L.R. 3d 1054 (1971)
Grisanti v. Cleveland, 89 Ohio L.AGs. 1, 181 N.:
2d 299 (1962)
Stahl v. Board of Finance,
163 A2d 396 (1960)
Oliver v. City of Clairton,
47 (1953)

6 2 N. J. Super , 562,
374 Pa. 333, 98 Al:

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98
(Dist of Col.)

- 22 -
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THERE WAS A PLAN FOR EACH PROJECT
AREA, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT.
Defendant-respondent does not dispute that there
are indeed two separate and distinct project areas.

From

the first stages of investigation ·and planning, the two
areas

have-been recognized as separate areas and have been

so designated as "Area Number l" and "Area Number 2".

The

boundary descriptions of each area appear in the newspaper
public notices, in the Redevelopment Plan itself and in
Ordinance #453 by which the Plan was adopted.

It is clear

from the entire record that at all times it was anticipated
by all parties that two separate geographical areas were to
be the targets for redevelopment.
It is equally clear, however, that at all times
a single process of planning covered->the two areas.

The very

nature of all discussion beginning with the earliest meetings
of the Murray City Commission, the presentation of all reports, maps (the two areas being indicated on a single map),
and the publications of notice, including boundary descriptions
of the areas printed as a single notice, make it clear that the
two areas were being planned for by a single, comprehensive Plan.
Section 11-19-10 states in its entirety:
"On its own motion, or at the direction
of the legislative body of the community
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or upon the written petition of the owners in fee of majority in area of any
redevelopment survey area, excluding
publicly owned areas or areas dedicated
to a public use, the agency shall select
one or more project areas comprising
all or part of such redevelopment survey
area, and formulate a preliminary plan for
the redevelopment of each project area in
co-operation with the planning commission
of the cornrnuni ty. "
Likewise, section 11-19-12 states:
"The agency shall prepare or cause to be
prepared a redevelopment plan ... "
It will be noted that neither section specifies that
separate plan is required for each separate project area,
but only that there be

~plan

to provide for each area.

The

entire record reflects compliance with the requirements of
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act.

-

24 -
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POINT

IV

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE DEFENDANT ACTED IN FULL
AND COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that there exists no
master or general community plan as required by section 11-19-5
despite the fact that this allegation is plainly controverted
by the presence in the record of. Ordinance #368 by which was
adopted the Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Murray City 1975, Part 40
(Exhibit "P") which, with its charts and Maps, meets all the
requirements of section 11-19-5.

This issue was summarily resolve

by Judge Dee, as reflected in his Memorandum Decision, entered
September 29, 1977 and subsequently by Judge Winder.
Plaintiff-appellant further alleges that when a city
commission chooses to "move into a posture" of considering a
redevelopment project, it "must announce its intention by formal
resolution".
states:

This is a clear misreading of section 11-19-6 which

"Redevelopment survey areas may be designated by

resolution of the legislative body upon recommend~tion of the
agency."

(emphasis added).

This section provides for a

discretionary procedure which may be used at an early stage of
planning, that is, at the stage at which a survey area is being
considered for redevelopment, before such area has actually
been designated as a project area.

In the event that such.a

procedure is utilized, section 11-19-8 makes provision for the
contents of such procedure.
- 25 -
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In any event, this allegation, also surnmarily
disposed of below, is controverted by a copy in the record
of the authority from the Murray Ctiy Cornmission (Exhibit "I")
Plaintiff-appellant further alleges that the Plan
does not provide for a method for relocating any families whic
might be displaced by the Plan.
summarily below.

This issue was also del t witt

The Plan, at pages 13 and 14 apparently

anticipates that little if any relocation will be necessary.
the event that such a necessity should arise, "the Agency shal
comply with the Federal Uniform Relocation Act as adopted in
1971 and amended from time to time and the State Relocation Ac
It is clear that a more specific plan for relocation is not
possible if the Plan has not in fact identified individuals or
businesses which might be in need of relocation.
Plaintiff-appellant's allegation that defendantrespondent failed to comply with the requirement of 11-19-1411
that the Plan be accompanied by the recommendations of the
planning commission has also been dealt with summarily below.
The minutes of the Murray City Commission meeting (Exhibit H)
indicates the necessary recommendations from the Murray City
Planning and Zoning Commission, in compliance with section
11-19-14(6).
In all respects, the Murray City Commission and th€
Redevelopment Agency complied fully with the requirements oft
Utah Neighborhood Development Act.

There is no merit in the
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allegations made by plaintiff-appellant and there was error by the
Trial court which granted defendant's

Motio~

for Summary

Judgment.

-
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POINT

V

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE INCREMENTAL FUNDING PLAN
AUTHORIZED BY THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT IS A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE METHOD OF FURTHERING THE
PUBLIC PURPOSES OF THAT ACT.
While plaintiff-appellant recognized that the
constitutionality of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act
was affirmed by this court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporat:
~40

P. 2d 499 (1975), it nevertheless insists that Tribe did

not address the question of
"whether or not such a use of tax revenues
could be permitted if they, in fact, diverted
the funds from another taxing body, and further,
it did not answer the question of whether or
not the shift of the tax burden to those
taxpayers living outside of the project area
was permissible under the Constitution of the
State of Utah."
In fact, the court in Tribe based its holding on
its determination that the redevelopment agency is:
" •.. an agency of the state designed for state
purposes .•• [T]he public purposes for which the
agency is organized inures to the benefit of
the public generally, therefore the public may
be ch~rge~ for such benefits through general
taxation.
(at paqe 503) (emphasis added)
The public purpose of which the court speaks may be
found in Section 2 of Senate Bill 3 S.S.#1, March 20, 1969,
wherein the legislature declared tha t " ... it is necessary f or
the welfare of the state and 1'ts inhabitants
·
that redevelopmen.'
agencies be authorized within cities-, counties or cities and
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counties .... in order to encourage the upgrading of property
in those areas."

The legislature further states:

"This Act

shall be liberally construed to effect its purposes."
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act and specifically
the provision of section 11-19-29, creates a method by which
-substandard buildings .and land _use may be improved, "with
the result, among other things of strengthening the tax base
and. ameliorating the economic health of the entire
Tribe, supra at page 502.

community~"

Thus are the legislative purposes

served.
The short-sightedness of the county plaintiff-appellant

is incomprehensible.

If there were no redevelopment plan as

provided for by the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, county
tax revenues would be fixed at the level of the assess valuation
of the blighted property.

Under the Utah Neighborhood Develop-

ment Act, no tax revenues are used to improve the property.
But the increased tax revenues generated by that improvement
after being used first to retire ..4_he, bonds by wh_ich the improvements. have been made go thereaft.e:r t.o the county.

Thus the Utah

Neighborhood Development Act provides a mechanism by which the
tax base may be raised, thus countering the very problem that
most fundamentally characterized blighted areas, namely, the
withering of the tax base.

Revenues to the county, after the

payment of the improvement costs, are increased manyfold, to
the benefit of all county residents, both in and out of the
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project area.
Plaintiff-appellant is taking precisely that
position by which other communities have painted themselves
into the corner of irretrievable blight and urban decay, leadin:
ultimately to municipal bankruptcy.

The relation between

blight and a reduced tax base is obvious.

The county's purpose

in attempting to obstruct the operation of section 11-19-29, thi
constitutionality of which section has already been affirmed by
this court, is beyond comprehension.
Plaintiff-appellant's second constitutional challeng'
concerns Article VI, §29 of the Utah Constitution by which
no "county, city, town, township, district or other political
subdivision" may lend its credit in aid of any "private individ:
or corporate enterprise O!" undertaking."

In response, defendan-

respondents can only cite once again from Tribe, supra (at page
503) by which this court dealt precisely and clearly with this
very issue:
"The Act specifically provides that the
bonds_and other obligations of the agency
are not a debt or obligation of the
community ...• [T]he bondholders can look
only to revenues from the operation of
the facilit.¥ and the allocated taxes for
retirement of the bond obligation. Under
the subject statute, providing for this
arrangement, there can be no city debt
created contrary to Article XIV, Sections
3 and 4; nor can there be a lending of the
city's- credit in contravention of Article
VI, Section 29."
(emphasis added)
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CONCLUSION
Defendants-respondents respectfully submit that
the trial court was correct in granting defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment because the defendants-respondents acted
in compliance with the provision of the Utah Neighborhood
Development Act and within the scope of the powers and
authority provided by that Act, and because in no respect is
that Act unconstitutional.
The trial court's responsibility and authority was
to determine if there was evidence before the legislative
body of Murray City upon which it could have based its decision,
not to substitute its judgment or opinion in place of that of
the legislative authority.

There was no abuse of discretion

fou-d by the trial court and none committed by it.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this
'),.-~ day of September,
1978 •.

~···~

ME~EN

Attorney for

City

'\~d~velopme

~CRAIG
Murray City
orney
5461 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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